A Pacific Free Trade Area? by Drysdale, Peter & Garnaut, Ross
A PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA? 
Peter Drysdale and Ross Garnaut 
Working Paper No. 25 
Peter Drysdale Ross Garnaut 
Australia-Japan Research Centre Australian National University 
Australian National University and Columbia University 
Working Paper Series 
Center on Japanese economy ana Business 
Graduate School of Business 
Columbia University 
January 1989 
A PACIFIC FREE TRADE AREA? 
Vigorous expansion of trade, investment and other economic ties 
within the East Asian and Pacific economy has been crucially 
important to the region's extraordinary growth in recent decades. 
This expansion has taken place without the framework of formal 
regional institutional arrangements that fostered integration a 
across the Atlantic among the original OECD countries.1 The 
growth of Pacific economic integration represents an impressive 
example of 'market integration' around institutional and legal 
barriers to trade, capital movements and other forms of economic 
interchange.2 Integration has occurred despite! persistent 
political resistance to the domestic structural implications of 
internationally oriented growth. In the course of growth, some 
barriers have been lowered, others have been introduced anew, or 
raised, and many remain. 
This paper takes as the central objective of international 
economic diplomacy in the Pacific region, the preservation and 
enhancement of the conditions for continued economic growth in 
the style of recent decades. The international system that has 
supported vigorous trade expansion is under threat from several 
directions: tension between the United States and Japan (and to a 
lesser extent between the United States and Taiwan and Korea) 
over large trade and payments imbalances; the prospect of 
increased economic Introversion in Europe as 1992 approaches; the 
accommodation of new patterns of comparative advantage in the 
Asian newly industrialised economies (NIEs) as they compress into 
a few years adjustments to a decade of rapid economic growth; and 
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the new challenge of managing the ©mergence of China, with its 
partially reformed centrally planned system, as a major player in 
Pacific economic relations, it is important for peace and 
political stability, too, that the environment of relatively open 
economic relations that made a realistic alternative to autarky 
available to China at a crucial point in its political history, 
is preserved to provide similarly reliable alternatives for the 
states of Indochina, the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea (DPRK), at a time of opportunity for progress 
on reducing longstanding sources of conflict. 
The central objective is thus a conservative one: to Ipreserve the 
current system of relatively open economic relations in the 
Pacific, however imperfect that may be. We would then add as 
second and third objectives, the reduction of barriers to intra-
Pacific trade, and the reduction of barriers to trade with major 
economies outside the region, particularly the European 
Communities. 
This paper examines whether these objectives would be enhanced by 
the formation of a Pacific Free Trade Area. 
-One question that must be—addressed is whether the central, 
conservative objective can be achieved without progress on the 
second and third objectives. Frustration at the lacK of progress 
in reducing Northeast Asian and European barriers to trade, 
especially on agricultural products, has been an important 
element in the corrosion of political support in the United 
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States and elsewhere for the multilateral system. We can expect 
this frustration to intensify if the Uruguay Round delivers 
disappointing results. 
We have been asked to assess the merits of and prospects for a 
Free Trade Area encompassing the market economies of the Western 
Pacific, together with the United States and Canada. Trade and 
other economic relations among these countries have been 
characterised by high intensity and rapid growth. They are thus 
a convenient group of economies to consider in this context. The 
role of the People's Republic of China must also be discussed as 
a trading economy similar in scale of total trade to Taiwan and 
the Republic of Korea, experiencing similarly rapid growth, 
specialised in labour-intensive manufactured exports in the early 
style of other Northeast Asian economies, and oriented towards 
the Pacific region in its foreign economic relations. 
Thus when, for brevity, we refer to 'the Pacific region', we 
include the United States, Canada, the Western Pacific market 
economies, and the People's Republic of China. Later we make 
separate reference to the circumstances of Mexico, Hacking close 
economic ties across the Pacific but trading intensively with the 
JJnited States, and to the centrally planned economies of the 
Western Pacific which as yet have only slender economic links 
with their Pacific neighbours. 
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Pacific Trade and Growth 
East Asian economies in recent decades have experienced stronger 
growth than the world had previously known on a sustained basis. 
From the mid-fifties, Japan grew at a rate that more than doubled 
output each decade, until, by the time of the first oil shock, 
its production per capita was close to the frontiers of the world 
industrial economy. The four Asian NIEs started their high 
growth later, in the early sixties, and from lower bases than 
Japan, but on average have grown even more rapidly,. Three of 
them, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, have already surpassed the 
flvArsgo pnr capita output in lower-income OECD countries. Korea, 
starting from a lower base, still seems likely to attain the 
living standards of OECD laggards before the end of the century. 
Over the past decade, China has joined the ranks of the high-
growth East Asian economies. It has been exceeding the goal that 
it set itself, to double real output each decade. 
In the principal ASEAN economies other than Singapore, that is, 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia;, growth haB 
been less consistent and more modest, but has comfortably 
exceeded average performance in world developed—and—developing 
economies alike since the late 1960s* 
Japan's growth since it broadly 'caught up' with productivity 
levels elsewhere in the OECD in the mid-1970s ha© been less 
I 
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spectacular, but has remained above the average for advanced 
economies. 
One result has been an historic shift in the centre of gravity of 
world production. In the early postwar period, when the liberal 
trading system around the GATT was being established, North 
America accounted for one-half of world GNP, and East Asia, 
devastated by war and civil strife, for only a few per cent. By 
the early 1960B, the North American share of world production was 
still extremely large, at around 40 per cent, while East Asia's 
share had increased to 9 per cent. By the early 1980s, North 
America's share of world GNP had fallen to 27 per cent while East 
Asia's had more than doubled, to 19 per cent. These trends have 
continued, and it seems that in the 1990s East Asia will 
contribute as much as North America to world GNP, with the two 
region's accounting for over one-half of world output*3 
These shifts in the locus of world economic power have 
implications for the leadership and management of the 
international trading system, and these are addressed later in 
the paper. 
East Asia's growth in recent decades has heen fla.etnr.it ntftri wf-fch a 
certain style of relating to the international eoonomy. The 
share of trade in output has expanded rapidly. The early years 
of rapid growth have been associated with powerful specialisation 
in the export of labour-intensive manufactures, but patterns of 
export specialisation have then progressed rapidly into more 
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capital-intensive production with growth in living standards. 
Trad© growth has been geographically focussed in the Pacific 
region. 
These trends, and some reasons for them, are illustrated in 
Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1 demonstrates the vast potential for intra-Pacific trade 
based on differences in relative endowments of natural resources, 
labour and capital. The theory of changing comparative advantage 
in the process of economic growth postulates that a poor country 
will initially have comparative advantage in production of 
natural resource-based products; that growth of the capital stock 
will cause comparative advantage to shift towards labour-
intensive manufactures and services if the country's per capita 
natural resource endowment is poor, but not otherwise; and that 
continued growth, reflected in higher per capita income, will 
cause comparative advantage to shift successively into more 
capital-intensive manufactures and services,4 
This pattern has been demonstrated by the growth experience of 
the Pacific. Wide variations in per capita natural resource 
endowments, represented crudely by population density in Table 1, 
suggest high complementarity between Australasia and North 
America on the one hand, and East Asia, particularly Japan and 
the Asian NlE's, on the other. The large variations in per 
capita income provide opportunities for trading capital-intensive 
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Table 1 
RESOURCE ENDOWMENTS, SECTORAL SHARES OF TOTAL TRADE AND 
1
 REVEALED* COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN DEVELOPED! AND 
DEVELOPING PACIFIC BASIN COUNTRIES, 1986a 
Notea; • Export* and imports refer to export and import aharea. reepeetively. 'Fevealed' 
comparative advantage la defined aa the ratio of the ahare of a commodity group in 
total exports for a country or group of eountriea to that commodity group'a ahare of 
world exporta. 
b Australia and New Zealand. 
c United Statea and Canada. 
d Bxcludee high-Income oil exportera. 
Source; Peter Dryadale, international Rconomic Pluralism: Economic Policy in Beet Asia and the 
Paoiflc. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988; updated from the International and 
World Bank. World Development Report. Mew York: Oxford Univeraity Press, 1988. 
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for labour-intensive manufactures. And the ascension of Japan 
and several of the NiEs into the ranks of relatively high income 
economies is opening rich new opportunities for intra-industry 
specialisation in trade in technologically sophisticated goods 
and services, especially amongst the adjacent economies of 
Northeast Asia, 
A distinctive feature of high growth in East Asia has been the 
rising shares of foreign trade in production, as the economies of 
the region put to good use the potential gains from trade 
deriving from widely different relative resource endowments. 
East Asian and Pacific trade is growing more rapidly than world 
trade. The dollar value of Europe-North America two-way trade 
increased slightly more than sixfold between the beginning of the 
1970s and 1987; Japan-North America trade increased almost 
tenfold; trade between Japan and the newly industrialising 
countries of Northeast Asia increased eighteenfoid; and trade 
between North America and the latter countries jumped more than 
forty-eightfold in the same period.5 Already the East Asian and 
Pacific region accounts for 37 per cent of total world trade. 
The huge economic transformation that has been taking place in 
^i^isJ^sJ!a^_br^u^hi_wJ 
away from the Atlantic as the focus of world trade. Table 2 sets 
out changes in the geographic structure of Pacific and world 
trade flows between 1965 and 19B7. Over this period, the Pacific 
share in world trade grew from around 30 per cent to almost 37 
per cent. Intra-regional trade grew from less than 50 per cent 
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to around 63 per cent of Pacific countries1 trade. The latter 
proportion approached that of Europe's intra-regional trade: in 
1987, intra-regional trade amounted to 71 per cent of Western 
Europe's total trade. Pacific countries' trade with each other 
is almost twice as large as their share in world trade. For 
Australasia, Northeast Asia other than Japan, ASEAN and China, 
the share of other Pacific countries in export and import trade 
is commonly higher, around 70 per cent of their total trade, 
Barriers to Pacific Trade 
The trade expansion that has supported East Asian growth and 
structural change represents an historic achievement of the 
international system. Nevertheless, old and new barriers have 
prevented realisation of substantial additional gains from trade 
amongst Pacific countries. 
Rapid economic growth has generated rapid change in comparative 
advantage, both in the East Asian economies and in their trading 
partners. The general record of structural adjustment in 
response to changing comparative advantage has been a good one -
as attested by the expansion and change in commodity composition 
of trade . ^ — e x a m p l e s — o f — g ^ v a r n r n e i T t s IrT^  
East Asia and elsewhere in the Pacific intervening to block the 
structural implications of growth. 
The major instances of high protection dissipating potential 
gains from intra-Pacific trade occur in large industries which 
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were rapidly losing comparative advantage as a result of economic 
change in Northeast Asia. Principal examples in industries 
producing goods include foodstuffs in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, 
and labour-intensive commodities (textiles, clothing and 
footwear, and consumer electronics) and standard technology 
manufacturing industries (metals, motor vehicles) in North 
America and Australasia. 
The outstanding example of barriers to lntra-Pacific trade is 
provided by Northeast Asian agricultural protection (Table 3). 
In the period covered by the table, Australia had negative 
protection for all agriculture. The United States had no 
protection on average for agriculture but high protection for 
sugar in the first half of the 1980s. The introduction of the 
export enhancement program and other agricultural assistance in 
recent years would have modified this picture, while leaving 
average United States assistance to agriculture at moderate 
levels in international terms. Japan, Korea and Taiwan, by 
contrast, provide extraordinarily high levels of assistance for 
all agriculture, and for the commodities that are of greatest 
importance in Pacific trade. The major liberalisation of 
Japanese beef imports announced in 1988 will significantly 
moderate protection levels for this commodity. 
Amongst Pacific countries not represented in the Table 3, New 
Zealand, following major liberalisation initiatives since 




SELECTED PACIFIC COUNTRIEST AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION, 1980 
(per cent) 
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generally provides low protection to agriculture, although dairy 
products, ©rid to a lesser extent sugar, are exceptions.* China 
and the ASEAN countries have highly distorted agriculture, but at 
current international prices probably low net assistance* In the 
case of China - important amongst other reasons for being the 
world's largest producer and consumer of grains and a range of 
other foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials - there may be 
little or no net assistance to the foodstuffs that are tt*"t 
important in current consumption, but high protection for meat 
and other high quality foodstuffs which are increasingly 
important in consumption as incomes rise. 
By comparison, the European countries assistance for agriculture 
is very high, but well below the levels in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan.7 
The general pattern of protection in manufacturing is more 
complex, and less easily summarised. Average tariff levels are 
now low in the United States, Canada and Japan, although by no 
means negligible in all commodities.9 Low nominal rates of 
tariffs nevertheless provide subtantial effective protection for 
some metals and metals products where little value is added in 
the manufacturing process. 
tariff 
Average rates of nominal V protection on all industrial products 
are much higher in Korea (23.5 per cent) and Taiwan (13.8 per 
cent).9 Highly protected categories in Korea include machinery 
and transport equipment (21.4 per cent), chemicals (21.4 p*r 
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cent) and miscellaneous manufactures (28.2 per cent) In Taiwan, 
highly protected categories include textiles (16 per cent), 
machinery and transport equipment (14.5 per cent) and chemicals 
(14.2 per cent). 
Australia and New Zealand for some years have had the highest 
average tariff levels on manufactured goods of all OECD 
ountries.10 Recent policy initiatives have reduoed rates 
subtantiallyr but averages remain high by OECD standards, 
although lower than for Korea and Taiwan. After the 
implementation of recently announced liberalisation measures, 
tariffs in Australia will remain very high only for passenger 
motor vehicles (35 per cent) and textiles, footwear
 Gna clothing 
(up to 35, 45 and 55 per cent respectively).11 New Zealand 
tariffs remain especially high for a similar range of goods. 
The proliferation of non-tariff protection devices during and 
since the mid-1970s recession have caused tariffs to be a most 
unreliable guide to manufacturing protection levels. Over this 
period we have seen the United States introduce major non-tariff 
protective devices in textiles, apparel, footwear, steel, 
automobiles and motorcycles, and consumer electronic goods 
—(^ te^ revison—and racTiosTjT** Recent policy initiatives have left 
Australia and New Zealand relatively clear of non-tariff barriers 
for manufactured goods. In Australia, quantitative restrictions 
in the form of tariff quotas (the main non-tariff barriers) now 
apply only to textiles, clothing and footwear. These 
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restrictions are being phased out in an announced series of steps 
ending in 1994. 
Contrary to international perceptions, Japan has the cleanest 
import system for manufacutured goods amongst OECD countries; 
official non-tariff barriers have almost no effect on trade.13 
The relatively low proportion of manufactured goods in Japanese 
imports, and low import penetration ratios in manufactured 
commodities in which other developed countries are major 
importers, have led protectionist interests in North America, 
Europe and Australasia, and sometimes officials and independent 
commentators in those same countries, to postulate a major role 
for non-official barriers, perhaps with official sanction. It is 
true that the Japanese distribution systems contain powerful 
conservative bias, delaying the emergence of large scale imports 
well beyond the time when imports appear to have become 
competitive. Such biases are not unique to Japan.14 Moreover, 
the evidence since the appreciation of the yen in 1985 suggests 
that, despite long lags the normal competitive pressures operate 
for Japan. Japan's imports of manufactured goods from Asian 
developing countries have been increasing at around 50 per cent 
per annum since 1985. The share of manufactures in Japanese 
_J^3i^LJUnp©r^te^*a«^e^rso^e^^ , 
although not so strongly from the United States (see Table 4),15 
Non-tariff barriers are high for manufactured goods in Korea and 




JAPAN* SHARE OF MANUFACTURED GOODS IN TOTAL IMPORTS, 1979-1988 
(per cent) 
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Manufacturing $mr production in China and other ASBAN countries 
is highly distorted by protection in the forms of high tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions and local content schemes. In China 
and the Philippines this is exacerbated by exchange controls, and 
in China by a large proportion of production still being 
allocated at arbitrary prices through state corporations. 
Recent attempt'? to itinnrmra !%*••-• *-««*»*«"* *••» ti*o viiiax M&JSAM 
countries have generated figures like 109 per cent effective 
protection for import-competing manufacturing in Indonesia,16 36 
per cent effective protection for all manufacturing in the 
Philippines,17 and 50 per cent (Corden method) or 71 per cent 
(Balassa) effective protection on importable manufacturing in 
Thailand.18 Malaysian average effective protection is probably 
close to the lowest in other ASEAN for manufacturing as a whole, 
but the most recent estimates suggest very high levels for such 
large categories as non-durable consumer goods (85 per cent), 
consumer durables (173 per cent) and machinery (39 per cent).19 
Each of the other ASEAN countries has attempted major 
liberalisation efforts over the past decade. There has been some 
modest progress, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand, and some 
retrogression. The genejrajLj5icjtu^^f^v^rX^ 
high protection remains. 
China and other ASEAN would benefit greatly by participation in 
international trade negotiations that provided incentives on the 
export side to liberalisation and rationalisation of their import 
19 
regimes* Indeed, the extension of East Asian high growth on a 
sustained basis to these important countries would seem to 
require such initiatives, which would also help to sustain growth 
elsewhere in the region. 
At a time when macro-economic frustrations in the United States 
have been generating aggressive reactions against all of the 
successful economies in East Asia, it should not be neglected 
that two economies in the region, Singapore and Hong Kong, have 
by far the cleanest import systems in the world, with barely a 
hint of restriction against trade in goods, and relatively few 
barriers to trade in services. 
For the other higher-income Pacific countries, protective 
barriers are highest in foodstuffs, textiles, clothing and 
footwear, and motor vehicles. They are significantly distorting 
in the production of domestic electrical equipment, iron and 
steel and (because of tariff escalation) non-ferrous metals. 
Table 5 sets out in some detail participation in world trade in 
commodities in which some Pacific countries have high protection. 
A striking feature of the table is the tendency for Pacific 
countries* exports to be heav^l^y^c^nojmtxaj^ 
against which other Pacific countries impose high barriers to 
trade. 
Table 5 
PACIFIC COMMODITY EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, 1986 
(US$ million, percentage of country/ 
region's total exports/imports) 
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Textiles, clothing and footwear accounted for a third of the 
total exports of Korea, mainland China and Hong Kong in 19B6, a 
quarter of the exports of Taiwan, and a high proportion of ASEAN 
manufactured exports. Significantly, excluding intra-EEC trade 
from the total, Pacific countries account for more than one half 
of total world exports in these commodities. Despite high 
protection (matched by similarly high barriers elsewhere), 
Pacific countries account for a similar proportion of world 
imports. 
A similar pattern emerges for trade in other commodities in which 
Pacific trade barriers are high. Excluding intra-EEC trade, 
Pacific countries account for two thirds of world motor vehicle 
exports. Amongst agricultural commodities. Pacific countries 
dominate world markets for wheat, feedgrains and rice, and supply 
half of the world's exports of beef« The proportion is lower for 
sugar in which tropical developing countries outside the Pacific 
are the important suppliers. 
This pattern has not emerged by accident. in the process of 
rapid economic growth in East Asia and changing comparative 
advantage throughout the region, all Pacific countries have moved 
tn_rirotect those industries in which they have most profoundly 
lost comparative advantage as a result of East Asian growth. 
From these data we can draw the strong conclusion that, should 
Pacific countries reduce assistance to their most highly 
protected industries on a non-discriminatory basis, the 
i 
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associated expansion of exports is likely to be concentrated in 
other Pacific countries simply on grounds of competitiveness. 
There is certainly considerable scope for further expansion of 
trade by Pacific countries through measures that provide more 
confident market access and that reduce the trade barriers that 
limit the realisation of the potentially Btrong complementarity 
within the region. Given the low resistances to regional trade 
reflected in regional trade concentration, the reduction of trade 
barriers on a moat-favoured-nation basis, in a way which does not 
offend Pacific countries' global trading interests, is likely to 
mean that most new suppliers of imports will come from within the 
region rather than from non-Pacific countries. 
The growth of East Asian and Pacific markets has made the major 
contribution to world trade growth over the last two decades, and 
especially over the past decade. Table 6 reveals that net of 
intra-European trade, around 50 per cent of world trade growth in 
this period has been in the Pacific market. 
Table 7 shows that Pacific markets have absorbed two thirds of 
the strong growth in East Asia's exports over the past two 
decades. East Asian import growth itself has absorbed one third 
of the total* The United States' role as a market was especially 
important in the decade from the mid-1970s recession, but has 
slowed since the macroeconomic adjustments of 19B5. Europe's 
role as a market, though much smaller, was nevertheless too 
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EXPORT GROWTH IN REAL TERMSb 1965-88 
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trade policy interest. It is noteworthy too, that Japan absorbed 
a significantly higher proportion of other East Asian economies' 
exports in the recent period of lower United States imports. 
The mutual trading interests among Pacific countries, together 
with the strong commitment to trade-oriented development 
strategies among the developing countries within the region, 
provide a likely springboard for trade and other foreign economic 
policy measures not only to accommodate the trade and development 
needs of all the countries with the region but also to strengthen 
the global system of commitments to an open international trade 
regime. 
Origins of the Pacific Free Trade Area Proposal 
The growth of the East Asian economy end of Pacific economic 
interdependence, the shift of world economic power away from 
Europe and the Atlantic towards East Asia and the Pacific, and 
the changed status of Japan and the United States in world 
affairs have all encouraged suggestions for a new focus in 
dealings among Pacific economies.20 Prominent in this discussion 
has been the notion of a developing community of interests in the 
Pacific and the recognition of advantages in closer Pacific 
economic cooperation; but the debate about what forms of 
institution-building might best ssrvs the interests of Pacific 
countries in managing and further developing their already 
substantial economic interrelationship has, until recently, 
eschewed the idea of integration European style. It is 
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illuminating to recall the context in which the Pacific free 
trade area (PAFTA) idea first ©merged, and of its revival as a 
focus in trade diplomacy. 
While the growth of East Asian and Pacific economic 
interdependence did not originate in the establishment of formal 
regional institutional arrangements, two important elements in 
the nexus of political and commercial history in which it took 
place can be identified easily. The first is the role played by 
the GATT in postwar recovery and growth; the second is the 
dominance of the United States through this formative period. 
First, postwar trade and economic growth flourished within the 
framework of the GATT-based international trading system under 
the leadership of the United States. The GATT-based trade regime 
grew out of the Atlantic Charter and the Mutual Aid Agreements of 
the wartime period21 and served well the cause of reconstruction 
and liberalisation of trade and economic activity for the first 
few decades or so after the Second World War. It provided the 
essentials of a global trade regime, far from comprehensive In 
its coverage of commodities or commercial interests (as some 
hoped the aborted plan for an International Trade Organisation 
might have^e^nJJ^_yet_huaelv supporJtJjEa nf tra4e—expansion—an& 
world economic recovery and growth generally. *2 This was 
critical to countries in East Asia and the Western Pacific which 
wore not immediate or direct beneficiaries under the initial 
rules and terms of GATT. But it also directed and limited trade 
and economic growth in some areas. 
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Second, the United States dominated the Pacific economy daring 
that period. American leadership, regional as well as global, 
was comprehensive and hegemonic, combining military-strategic, 
political and economic interests. In this period the Pacific 
alliance against the Soviet-bloc in the Cold War era was 
conceived and executed* 
The GATT framework (and importantly Japan's eventual 
accommodation within it under the aegis of the united States) and 
the framework of the Pacific security alliances provided the 
underpinnings for the confident development of trading links 
within the East Asian and Pacific economy. 
The idea of a community of Pacific countries associated in some 
form of regional arrangement began to emerge in the middle of the 
1960s, principally in business and academic circles, and later, 
tentatively, in official quarters.23 The motive for the interest 
in this idea was the preservation of the opportunities for 
internationally oriented economic development which had gene-rated 
such spectacular results, against corrosive pressures generated 
by that growth itself, and against emergence of economic 
introversion in Europe associated with the entrenchment and 
BxpBriB±orr~o£ the EEC. 
At that time, as still now, the United States-Japan relationship 
was the most important single relationship within the Pacific 
region. But Australia and Japan were already developing a quite 
significant bilateral economic relationship, which had grown out 
29 
of commercial initiatives in the mid-1950s. In their subsequent 
reactions to the changing international economic environment, 
both countries moved towards closer involvement with each other, 
There is no better illustration of this than their response to 
the emergence of the EEC and the problems of global market access 
in the middle of the 1960s*24 
Australia's response to the damaging effects of the European 
Common Agricultural Policy on the prospects for Australian 
economic growth based on the expansion of its traditional markets 
for agricultural exports was to intensify the development of new 
markets in Japan, the Pacific and East Asia.25 Japan's response 
to the emergence of a discriminatory bloc in Western Europe and 
increasing dependence on raw materials supplies from the region 
was to encourage closer economic relations with its main Pacific 
trading partners, and to pursue a line of commercial diplomacy 
designed to counter the effects of intensified European 
protectionism by developing an alignment of interests within the 
Pacific economy.26 
The first detailed proposal for a Pacific regional economic 
association took the form of a free trade area scheme and emerged 
in Japan.27 m e rationale—advanced—for—institutional 
integration, involving discriminatory treatment in international 
trade, was based upon analysis of the effects of the formation of 
the European Economic Community upon the Pacific five advanced 
industrial countries and upon the relations between them and the 
developing countries of Asia and the Pacific (the 'extended 
j 
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Pacific area').28 The starting point in this argument was that 
'each time a shock was felt from outside the five Pacific 
countries, the necessity for closer Pacific integration was felt 
more seriously' .29 
The proposal for a Pacific free trade area, consisting of the 
Pacific five as full members and incorporating East Asian 
developing countries as associate members enjoying non-
reciprocated tariff concessions, was primarily a reaction to the 
establishment of the European Economic Community.30 The EEC was 
destined, it was felt, not only to have a huge impact on 
international trade and investment flows, but also of world 
economic power. The completion of the EEC's internal tariff 
elimination in 1968 added to fears of an increasingly inward 
looking and self-sufficient European bloc damaging to Pacific 
interests in global market access.31 The logic of Pacific 
economic integration was urged, both in response to the threat of 
institutional integration in Europe and as a vehicle for 
realising the potential of the East Asian and Pacific region. 
The completion of the Kennedy Round of negotiations in 1967 gave 
tactical point to the PAFTA proposal.32 
The most important factor working against the earlier Pacific 
free trade area proposal was the global interest in United States 
commercial diplomacy. The United States could not easily or 
sensibly participate in discriminatory regional trading 
arrangements through a grouping of either European or Pacific 
countries; this course would have been quite incompatible with 
31 
its stature in world trade at that time, and contrary to the main 
thrust of its approach to international trade policy*33 
Moreover, the Pacific five included countries of disparate sizB 
and lacked the degree of integration required to make the 
dismantling of protective measures within the group politically 
or economically feasible.34 
Nonetheless, the foreign economic policy interest which underlay 
the Pacific free trade area proposal, while perhaps over-
ambitious and of limited immediate policy relevance, contained 
the seeds of a useful approach to important problems which were 
emerging in the growing economic and other relations among the 
diverse economies and societies of the East Asian and Pacific 
region.35 The huge growth of trade, investment and aid 
relationships among the countries of East Asia and the Pacific 
was spawning not only opportunities but quite predictable policy 
problems that would be managed less and less well within 
established bilateral arrangements or by individual countries 
unilaterally. In this context the first exposure of a Pacific 
froo trade area proposal provided a useful impetus to the 
evaluation of other ideas directed towards the objectives of 
closer Pacific economic cooperation. 
In the following two decades, Pacific economic cooperation 
interests came to focus heavily on building institutions that 
were functionally related to the economic interests of individual 
Pacific countries and to the region as a whole, and on the 
evolution of support for an open global economic regime within 
I 
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which Bast Asian and Pacific countries could continue their 
economic expansion. In 1980, a meeting in Canberra saw the 
establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference 
(PECC).S6 The PECC meetings, with the involvement of government 
officials, industry leaders, and people from the research 
community, have led to productive exchanges on trade policy 
issues. They were part of the intellectual background to an 
early call for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in 
December 1983, and for consultations among the officials of 
several Western Pacific countries, in preparation for what became 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 
Such mechanisms are evolving because an infrastructure of 
regional consultation and cooperation is necessary to make the 
development of Pacific positions practicable; because of the 
region's growing industrial might and economic interdependence; 
because reduction of policy uncertainties offers large potential 
gain through a stronger framework for regional economic 
relations; and booouse they assist the communication of the 
diverse policy objectives of very different countries and of 
smaller and weaker economic partners in the Pacific. Growing 
knowledge among Pacific countries of each other*s institutions 
and policy praotloea strengthana 4-h« TAX^I—of mutual confidence 
in national economic policies and reduces psychological and 
political barriers to the movement of commodities, capital and 
the relocation of production, all of which can serve to enhance 
international welfare. 
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Free Trade Areas Resuscitated 
In the contemporary international economic policy environment, 
serious challenges to East Asian development ambitions have again 
emerged in the area of trade policy. A characteristic of 
industrial transformation in EaBt Asian countries is that their 
trade growth has required the taking over of market shares from 
established exporters, first in labour-intensive manufactured 
goods, as Japan did from Britain and Europe in both the prewar 
and postwar periods, and as the other newly industrialising 
countries of East Asia have done from Japan and in recent decades 
from one another.37 It follows that arrangements which limit or 
discriminate against this type of trade growth and transformation 
would, by ossifying established trade shares, frustrate East 
Asian development ambitions, adversely affect Pacific trade 
interests and, thereby, limit the growth potential of the world 
economy. 
The thrust of the GATT trade regime and other international 
institutions established after the Second World War was towards 
the establishment of an open trade regime which embodied, 
importantly, the principles of 'non-discrimination*, 
'predictability1, 'transparency1 and 'openness*.3* These 
principles steadily gained expression in successive GATT reviews 
and rounds of trade liberalisation, in the unconditional most-
favourable-nation rule, in the adoption of tariffs as the 
principal and 'acceptable' form of trade protection, and in the 
'binding' of tariff rates to negotiated levels.39 In applying 
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these principles and rules the architects of the GATT sought to 
avoid the experience of trade restrictions, bilateralism and 
uncertainty of the interwar years and develop a confident global 
framework within which the benefits of trade liberalisation would 
flow to all from the action of a relatively small number of major 
trading nations.10 
A trading system incorporating these principles and rules was of 
particular importance to smaller countries seeking economic 
growth through trade expansion. One of the great achievements of 
the United States and multilateral commercial diplomacy in the 
postwar period was undoubtedly the accommodation of Japan within 
the GATT most-favoured-nation trading framework, despite the 
initial application of Article XXXV permitting discrimination 
against Japan by many trading nations until the 1960s. Without 
appeal to GATT principles and the GATT framework, Japan would 
hardly have been able to achieve so smoothly the economic growth 
and trade expansion that it did achieve in the first few decades 
after the war. An open international market where trade 
discrimination is constrained by general adherence to the most-
favoured-nation rule allows the accommodation of new and 
competitive suppliers, for whom trade is a central factor to 
economic growth and 1ndnntrJ>jtHFiat*pnt And BO, in the postwar 
period, the GATT regime has facilitated a major transformation in 
the geographic structure of world trade and the emergence of Bast 
Asia*s economy. The main 'internal* influence on the trade 
policy interests of East Asian and Western Pacific countries 
continues to lie in the economic relationships of these countries 
i 
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with the United States. The United States is a major market for 
manufactured goods exports from the region. The Northeast Asian 
countries In particular are likely to see more value in trade 
liberalisation movements if they include the United States. For 
its part, the United States has shown an increasing interest in 
the Western Pacific as the region has grown in importance, and 
the share of United States trade with the region has increased* 
Thus far, as is evident even in respect of Japan, the United 
States has tended to approach trade relations with particular 
East Asian countries in a case-by-case bilateral manner, the 
results of which have not always been consistent with moat-
favoured-nation principles. 
In the lead-up to launching the new GATT round, the United States 
shifted towards a trade diplomacy based on the conditional most-
favoured-nation approach, seeking 'free trade area solutions' to 
its trade policy problems.41 The agreement with Israel and the 
negotiation of a free trade arrangement with Canada were 
important targets in this policy approach (as well as the much-
heralded Caribbean free trade arrangement). There seems to be 
strong interest within the United States for entering closer 
economic arrangements with Mexico, thus moving towards a North 
American Free Trade Area. There are also suggestions at this 
time for some sort of 'free trade area' associations between the 
United states and Western Pacific countries (ASEAN, Australia and 
and others). On the face of it, it seems that these United 
States suggestions are not aimed at the ultimate establishment of 
a Pacific free trade area but rather at setting up a bilateral 
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dealing mechanism between the United States and some Western 
Pacific countries on a different footing from, and separate from, 
United states bilateral dealings with Japan, Whichever is the 
case, western Pacific countries have been given reasons to 
consider a 'free trade area' association in the Pacific. 
Problems in the United States-Japan Relationship 
For Pacific countries, the most important game-play in 
international trade diplomacy still revolves around the 
management of the economic relationship between the United States 
and Japan.42 This is the most important relationship within the 
Pacific economy, and among the most important in the world. The 
way in which trade and commercial policies had come to be 
praotised in the Pacific by the mid-1980s focussed sharply upon 
the serious Imbalances between the United States and Japan and 
they were one motivation in the evolution of a new free trade 
area approach to Pacific trade diplomacy. 
Heightened tension in the management of the United States-Japan 
relationship in the first half of the 1980s resulted mainly from 
serious miscalculations in the macroeconomic policies of both 
countries and the lack of effective macroeconomic policy 
coordination. This was a recurrent problem from the late 1960s, 
but extreme imbalances, focussed on rising United States current 
account deficits and Japanese surpluses, emerged very rapidly 
between 1981 and 1985. The main adjustments for both Japan and 
the United States had to be on the macroeconomic front, and those 
| 
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adjustments were set in train, rather belatedly, after the Plaza 
Agreement of September 1985 forced the pace through the exchange-
rate shift.*3 
These developments in the United States-Japan relationship were 
of some consequence for the shape of Pacific trade diplomacy* 
Both countries were diverted into attempts to resolve their 
global trade imbalances by action directed at each other (both 
negative and positive action: specific restrictions or 
surcharges; and bilateral market access managements). in the 
conduct of the United States-Japan relationship, specific trade 
issues came to dominate the policy approach. A related 
development, and danger for Western Pacific and other countries, 
was that Japan-targeting by the United states and the American 
obsession in Japan led both parties to negotiate bilateral deals 
which were damaging to third parties and confidence in the whole 
trading system. 
The cry of 'specific reciprocity' as the guiding principle for 
trade and commercial policy became stronger and stronger in the 
United States over this period. 'Specific reciprocity' (the 
careful equilibration of benefits in country-by-country and 
sector-by-sector settlements in which market-sharing arrangements 
are the goal and tit for tat is a legitimate strategy) i8 
contrasted with the 'uncertain benefits' of 'diffuse reciprocity' 
(such as is embedded in the GATT system, under which multilateral 
negotiations and agreements foster a Bet of rules and norms in 
which reciprocity seeks an overall balancing of concessions)«44 
'Strategic trad© policy'48 and 'fair trade' are the intellectual 
and political slogans heralding this new American policy 
environment. In the 1980s, the Reagan Administration clung to 
the rhetoric of 'diffuse reciprocity'; the political processes 
increasingly demanded the practice of 'specific reciprocity'. 
The political processes and eventually the intellectual argument 
targeted on Japan in justifying the retreat from support for a 
global regime based upon multilateral agreements and 'diffuse 
reciprocity * .46 
In the negotiations preparatory to the extension of an 
international systemic public good, such as are involved in 
changes to the trade regime through a new GATT round, interplay 
between the interests of 'specific reciprocity' (among the major 
groups of trading nations) and 'diffuse reciprocity' (the 
application of generalised rules and norms of behaviour) is a 
natural if not essential ingredient.17 The first step in the 
process addresses the 'free rider' problem among the principal 
players, encouraging all of them to join in the exchange of 
concessions; the seoond delivers 'stable, beneficial arguments in 
complex multilateral situations'4' involving domestic politics 
end international relations as well as economic interests. 
Certainly Japan's role in trade liberalisation and the 
^^ ego%ireHtiren—&£ international settlements on other commercial 
policy, exchange rate and macroeconomic policy issues is a 
central element in Pacific economic policy, but it will only be 
supportive of broader Pacific policy objectives if it finally 
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eschews 'specific reciprocity' in dealings with the United States 
and does not neglect third country interests* The idea, with 
which Ambassador Mansfield has been associated, of a United 
States-Japan free trade area, is not therefore a sensible 
ultimate goal. The question in this context is whether third 
country interests are sufficiently encompassed within the Pacific 
to make attractive the idea of a broader Pacific free trade 
association. The short answer to that question must be that 
Japan's interests (as well as those of the newly industrialising 
countries of East Asia) now extend well beyond any group of 
Pacific countries which could readily or easily join a Pacific 
free trade area. The importance of the European relationship, 
the delicate development of interdependence with China, the 
emergence of the Soviet bloc and the opportunity for the 
emergence of Vietnam and the DPRK from their past isolation are 
only some of the factors which extend East Asia's 'third country' 
interests and commitments to the multilateral trade and economic 
system. 
Response to Free Trade Area Proposals 
One possible response to United States expressions of interest in 
special trade relations with various Western Pacifio countries is 
to call for negotiations to establish a Pacific Free Trade Area, 
covering the United states, Canada, and some combination of 
economies from the Western Pacifio. 
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Would such a response be helpful to the key strategic objectives 
we identified earlier: the shoring up of the system of 
imperfectly open trade in the Pacific that has facilitated rapid 
growth encompassing successively most of East Asia; the reduction 
of barriers to intra-Pacific trade; and the reduotion of European 
barriers to Pacific trade7 
A free trade area is more likely to bring net benefits the larger 
the economic size of the union envisaged. We have observed that 
the Pacific, as we have defined it, accounts for just under one-
half of world production of goods and services, and is likely tD 
account for a higher proportion in future* 
The Pacific countries are more important to each other's trade 
and potential trade than these output figures alone would 
suggest. The exceptionally high complementarity discussed 
earlier in the paper, and the economic advantages of intense 
Western Pacific trade that derive from location, each point to an 
increased likelihood that a Pacific Free Trade Area would 
generate net benefits for its members and, though less 
powerfully, for the world as a whole. 
We have observed that barriers to trade in Pacific countries are 
highest in precisely those commodities within which the 
comparative advantage of other Pacific countries is strongest; 
protection in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea against agricultural 
exports from Australasia and North America? protection in 




from China, the Asian NlEs and other ASEAN countries, and against 
exports of a range of more capital-intensive standard technology 
products, especially motor vehicles, from Japan and the Asian 
NlEs. This increases tho likelihood of net gains from a Pacific 
Free Trade Area that is not subject to important exemptions. 
The last qualification is important* The reality of free trade 
areas and customs unions in practice is that exceptions have been 
important at least in their early years; and where they have not, 
the establishment of the area has been associated with increased 
barriers to trade with the rest of the world. This outcome iB 
driven by an important asymmetry in the political economy of 
protection policy, between the highly focussed opposition to 
trade creation by established interests in protected industries, 
together with the highly focussed support of established 
interests in trade diversion, on the one hand, and the diffuse 
beneficiaries from trade creation on the other.49 Hence the 
tendencies towards higher protection against the rest of the 
world that can be observed early in the lives of the United 
States, Canadian, Australian and European customs unions, and the 
proliferation of exceptions early in the lives of the Australia-
New Zealand and United States-Canada Free Trade Areas. 
One would be blind to the realities of the political economy of 
protection to ignore the likelihood that, in a Pacific Free Trade 
Area, the process of negotiation and compromise would favour 
trade diversion over trade creation. 
4Z 
Neither can we presume that all Pacific countries would seek to 
participate in negotiations to establish a free trade area. 
China, with its partially reformed prices system, is not now in a 
position to accept the obligations of participation in a "clean" 
free trade area. It would be possible in principle to negotiate 
a range of commitments to open trade by China that led in the 
direction of more open and even free trade. But the presence of 
special rules of thumb to govern China's trade relatione with the 
Pacific would invite the proliferation of commitments Bhort of 
free trad© by other participants, especially but not only in 
developing countries. Yet to exclude China would carry 
considerable costs. It could retard China's progress towards 
more open trade relations/ thus reducing the chances of ultimate 
success in the whole modernisation program* Trade diversion from 
China within a smaller Pacific Free Trade Area would generate 
tonsions and retaliation that would carry costs of their own. 
And if China continued to grow strongly despite these new 
obstacles, over time a progressively smaller proportion of 
opportunities for profitable intra-Pacific trade would be covered 
by the free trade area, thus weakening the presumption of net 
benefits for members and the world as a whole. 
Nor is it likely that the ASEAN countries would accept membership 
of a clean free trade area. Governments in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and even Thailand have all compromised 
heavily in implementing trade liberalisation programs over the 
past decade.50 Attempts at intra-ASEAN liberalisation have 
yielded much more trade diversion than trade creation. Despite 
the attraction of open access to North American and Australasian 
markets it is unlikely that the ASEAN states would agree to 
participate fully. To exclude ASEAN and to expose its members to 
trade diversion in favour of other Pacific economies would reduce 
the gains from Pacific integration, and set back the hesitant 
process of trade liberalisation in the ASEAN economies 
themselves. To welcome ASEAN membership on a non-reciprocal or 
incompletely reciprocal basis would invite pressures elsewhere 
for the proliferation of exceptions. 
We defined our first objective as the preservation of the 
relatively but imperfectly open trading environment that had 
supported the productive extension of rapid growth in East Asia 
in recent decades* This objective seems to us to rule out 
embarkation on an integration process that runs a severe risk of 
setting back severely the prospects for internationally oriented 
growth in China and the ASEAN states. 
Now let us presume for analytic purposes that it was possible to 
wave a magic diplomatic wand and embark on a process of 
negotiation that actually delivers a clean and comprehensive 
Pacific Free Trade Area. Would such a process help or hinder the 
reduction of barriers to trade between Pacific countries and 
trading partners in the rest of the world? 
The process of establishment of a Pacific Free Trade Area would 
require a huge concentration of political and administrative 
effort within all member countries. This would inevitably divert 
\ 
attention from wider trade policy objectives in the international 
system. 
The effort would follow perceptions of failure in the Uruguay 
Round of trade negotiations and disillusionment with the 
multilateral trading system. But the fact of disappointment with 
the GATT-based system would not in itself demonstrate that an 
imperfect system of wider international trading relatione oould 
not get worse. 
it is not clear to us how a commitment to a Pacific Free Trade 
Area, involving substantial trade diversion away from the rest of 
the world in the best of scenarios, would facilitate the 
negotiations of lower trade barriers with the European 
Communities. It is possible that the threat of such developments 
would focus European governments more clearly on the need for 
oucoeea in the Uruguay Round. Dut aetion to implement this 
threat would have the effect of, at best, suspending progress on 
the negotiation of reciprocal liberalisation with Europe during a 
long transitional process. 
Similarly, the diversion of trade policy-making resources into 
the development of PAFTA, and the diyersion of trade from the 
rest of the world, would weaken the region's capacity to respond 
_ cdtu***-**^ 
to early stirrings of interest in internrfrfcy-oriented development 
in the Soviet Union and Indochina, and the tentative signs of 
possible future stirrings in the DPRK that can be read into 
recent statements on Korea from the Soviet Union. For the 
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foreseeable future, the expansion of trade relations between the 
Pacific countries and these centrally planned economies is of 
minor importance in narrowly economic terms. But it would be 
foolish to diminish the potential for reduction in political 
tension and the threat of war, and eventually reduction in 
military expenditure, that would over time be associated with 
constructive Pacific responses to these centrally planned 
economies' interest in closer economic relations. 
The United States at least would be mindful of Mexican and other 
Latin American interests in the process of Pacific integration. 
The accommodation of these interests would further increase the 
likelihood of cpoaial arrangomcnto and oxooptione within PAFTA. 
It may seem that the liberalisation of access to trade in 
services appears more likely to be susceptible to treatment under 
the aegis of the 'free trade area' approach. The obstacles to 
international competition in services do not arise mainly through 
fiscal mechanisms as they do with tariffs on commodities. They 
take the form of government monopoly of service (communications); 
government controls on entry or capacity (aviation); 
prescriptions of qualifications for entry (professional 
services); or rules on domestic content (media). Some of the 
restrictions involve international agreements on rights or 
conditions of operation. These issues may appear easier to press 
through arrangements such as the Australia-New Zealand Closer 
Economic Trade Agreement (CER). However, while their 
multilateral negotiation may be difficult at this point, they are 
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not likely to be treated easily within the framework of a 
Pacific-wide free trade area (as United States-Canada experience 
attests)* indeed, the complexities of service trade 
liberalisation would seem equally amenable to negotiation within 
the framework of broader most-favoured-nation type trade and 
commerce agreements, alongside commodity trade issues. 
We conclude that efforts to establish a Pacific Trade Area are 
not consistent with Pacific countries' interests in more 
effective movement towards global trade liberalisation. 
Discriminatory trade arrangements within the Pacific region, and 
discriminatory treatment of Japan by the United States and other 
Western Pacific countries, or of other Western Pacific countries 
by Japan and the United States, are inconsistent with East Asian 
and Pacific trade policy interests and are likely to damage the 
growth performance of other countries in the region. If, on the 
other hand, the 'free trade area' suggestion were not intended to 
involve trade discrimination within the Pacific, it may provide 
an impetus for accelerating movement toward liberalisation on a 
most-favoured-nation basis, both in the region and more broadly. 
The important requirement in such discussions would be to avoid 
any acceptance of the discrimination against non-Pacific 
countries implied by the term 'free trade area', and to work 
toward finding areas of reciprocal concession that can be offered 
on a most-favoured-nation basis. But how can we reconcile this 
approach with recent tendencies within United States trade policy 
and, more broadly, with the reduced willingness of the United 
( 
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States to continue to provide liberal leadership to the 
multilateral trading system? 
The Diminished Hegemon 
The diminished relative position of the United States in the 
Pacific and world economies is an inevitable result of the 
success of American international economic policy in the postwar 
period. 
The United States has prospered exceptionally in the liberal 
trading system of which it was the chief sponsor. And this same 
system has sponsored more rapid growth in smaller and initially 
much poorer American allies and trading partners as they have 
utilised opportunities for expanding gains from trade. This is 
exactly what a priori analysis would have led us to expect if we 
had known that the postwar mechanisms were going to work well. 
Yet in the place of self-congratulation in the United States, we 
see recrimination and the adoption of attitudes and policies that 
threaten to undermine the liberal international system. 
Some analysts have sought the explanation for the changed United 
States approach in a theory of the hegemonic leader in the supply 
of an international public good, the open multilateral trading 
system. AS by far the largest country in the early postwar 
system, and by implication the largest beneficiary of it, the 
United States needed and was prepared to play a leadership role 
in supplying the 'public good', while letting 'free riders' in 
4tt 
Europe, Australasia, Japan and the developing countries escape 
•I 
the burden of accepting symmetric market-access obligations. 
But the relative decline of the United States in world production 
and trade in the subsequent decades has diminished united States 
preparedness to carry the costs of leadership. Restoration of 
the health of the system requires the emergence of a new hegemon, 
willing and able to carry these costs. But there is none in 
sight. 
There is a problem for an economist in this line of analysis. 
The required leadership, that is, the maintenance oneself of an 
open system, may carry some adjustment costs, but conveys overall 
a benefit, presuming that the hegemon does not so dominate world 
markets that a diminution of the extent of its trade can improve 
its terms of trade sufficiently to outweigh the allocative costs 
of reduced specialisation. In circumstances of hegemonic 
decline, the expectations of the leader gaining from free trade, 
even if its trading partners impose protection, are even larger, 
since variations in its own level of trade will be even less 
influential in determining relative prices. Symmetrically, the 
small country's imposition of barriers to trade, far from being a 
'free ride', imposes costs that, if anything, are greatest when 
its relative size is least* 
Bhagwati52 has Bought to rationalise observed tendencies in the 
international system by supposing that the United States earlier 
was acting as the leader in a different sense by permitting 
'Juutifiable aaymiiiwtritJw' of ubliyaLionfe on a temporary basis. 
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As the temporary circumstances ended, with recovery in Europe and 
growth in the Western Pacific, the United States demanded 
reciprocity of access. 
Again, there are problems in this logic if a rationale is sought 
in the calculation of national economic interest. 
There are, however, two possible ways in which the United States 
might rationally have been pursuing national interest. First, 
the introduction of distortions into trade, to the cost of itself 
and its partners in the international system, might be rationally 
calculated to force partners to drop trade distortions of their 
own. This is the expressed objective of the massive retaliation 
against European agricultural subsidies through the United 
states' export enhancement program,83 It is incidental to this 
argument that the retaliatory instruments ohosen by the United 
States imposed proportionately higher costs on innocent 
bystanders. The key test of rationality is whether the 
retaliation was well judged to force liberalisation elsewhere. 
If the realities deny good prospects for such a response in 
Europe, the retaliation can only damage United States interests. 
Second, the descent into bilateralism seems to have had some 
success in enhancing United States interests at the expense of 
third pen. titejfa through trade diversion. The United States has 
been able to pursue this approach in agriculture, where 
protection is commonly provided by administered import quotas 
which may be allocated to discriminate between suppliers. This 
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might convey a narrow and short-term benefit to the United States 
alone, but this benefit would be offset to some extent by the 
indirect cost to the United States of losses borne by other 
allies and trading partners. 
This has been important recently in United States bilateral 
initiatives towards increasing American shares of East Asian 
commodity markets. An important case in point concerns the 
Japanese beef trade• In the minerals trade, coal markets have 
been affected in a similar but lesser way through different 
mechanisms. In response to demands by the United States for 
greater access to the Japanese market, beef import restrictions 
have been altered so as to allow more United States imports, but 
this has been at the expense of third countries, particularly 
Australia. In the four years to 1983, the United States share in 
the volume of Japanese beef and offal imports rose from 31 par 
cent to 44 per cent, while the Australian share fell from 62 per 
cent to 49 per cent. The total import volume rose by lees than 
10 per cent during the period.54 This policy approach was turned 
around in the settlement with Japan in July 1988, when that 
country delivered reform of its beef trade system consistently 
with the important GATT principles of 'transparency' and 'non-
discrimination* . 
Both in the 'massive retaliation1 against European subsidies and 
in the bilateral initiatives, any case for action in the United 
States' narrow national interest would have been as strong in 
earlier times as in recent years. It is not obvious how the 
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relative decline of the United States in world production end 
trade would have strengthened the economic case for action in 
recent times. 
The key to understanding the new United States attitudes to the 
international trading system lies outside anything that is 
happening mainly in that system itself, namely in the polity's 
incapacity to come to grips with profound macroeconomic 
imbalances. other countries' protection policies are blamed for 
a payments imbalance that has its origins in domestic budgetary 
policy. The problem for other countries in managing the United 
States' challenge to the liberal system is that large scale trade 
liberalisation in East Asia and Europe is incapable of 
contributing in a major way to curing the United States current 
accounts problems. There would seem to be no reliable prospect 
for addressing current international trade tensions independently 
of United States progress in moderating domestic demand, in 
pursuit of balance in current external payments. 
This is where hegemonic decline may be important. The United 
States polity, wounded by macroeconomic difficulties, has lost 
tolerance for the weaknesses in the trade policy performance of 
others, independently of rationally calculated national 
_a^v^nJba^e^__Tlie_Jjicxease-^n—tt±*ttvor^Bto&~~mi&~~3^rength ^f others 
is important principally for its effects on political reactions 
at all levels in the United States. 
52 
It is a dangerouB time to take risks and liberties with the 
multilateral system. 
A Pacific Approach to Liberalisation 
How then can the United States' partners in the Pacific respond 
to these powerful new currents in trade policy, consistently with 
non-discriminatory liberalisation? 
Realisation of the fragility of the system provides strong 
grounds to work towards success in the Uruguay Hound. The United 
States' administration and wider polity is likely to judge 
success first of all in terms of progress on agriculture. The 
European Communities, Japan and also Western Pacific developing 
countries would be wise to calculate carefully the cost of 
inadequate movement on agriculture, beyond the usual cost of 
foregone gains from trade. 
Disappointing progress in the GATT Round will herald a highly 
dangerous period for the international trading system. 
This will be a time for re-chanelling interests in a Pacific Free 
Trade Area into renewed regionally based efforts to strengthen 
the multilateral system; 
The strategic problem in pursuing discussions under the *free 
trade area' umbrella, will be to maintain a focus on non-
discrimination and to find areas of reciprocal concessions which 
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are capable of sustaining United States interest in the 
discussions. From the viewpoint of Western Pacific countries, 
the most important concessions by the United States would relate 
to access to the United States markets for manufactured goods in 
which East Asian countries are most competitive. 
For the United States to extend such concessions on a most* 
favoured-nation basis would not, with the exception of steel, 
have a strong impact on United States-Europe trade. The areas of 
greatest Japanese competitiveness do not now coincide closely 
with European competitiveness in the United States market. in 
fact, initial United States concessions to Japan could simply 
consist of the removal of trade arrangements such as 'voluntary 
export restraints' which discriminate against Japanese goods. 
However, concessions relevant to East Asian developing countries 
would affect United States trade with Latin America if offered on 
a most-favoured-nation basis. For this reason it would be 
sensible for the united States to engage Latin American countries 
in the process of reciprocation alongside Pacific discussions. 
The main areas of concession which could be offered to the United 
States by Western Pacific countries are agricultural trade 
liberalisation and liberalisation of access to trade in services. 
The involvement of the United States in trado negotiations would 
make significant progress in agriculture more feasible, both 
because of United States interest in that area and because of the 
significance for Northeast Asian countries of the concessions 
which the United States would be able to offer in exchange. 
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Western Pacific developing countries would find advantage in 
increased access for labour-intensive manufactures, and more 
secure access for more capital-intensive standard technology 
manufactures in developed country markets. 
While the United States may have benefited from its country-by-
country bilateral bargaining over access to East Asian commodity 
markets in the past, the benefits have been severely limited by 
the quantitative restrictions on overall agricultural trade. 
Movement towards more liberal agricultural trade would benefit 
Australasia, for example, relative to the United States by 
removing present discrimination, but would yield substantially 
greater gains to all agricultural exporters (including the United 
States) than have been achieved in existing bilateral dealings. 
Hence, Australia's initiative in forming the 'Cairns Group* of 
efficient agricultural exporters has sought to engage the United 
States and other agricultural exporters in the negotiation of a 
more general and phased liberalisation of the agricultural 
trading system,55 
The approach suggested here dxawb its prospects for suocooo from 
the tendency for barriers to intra-Pacific trade to be highest in 
commodities and markets in which other Pacific economies are 
competitive suppliers. The incentive for participation, beyond 
realisation that the liberal trading system is in peril, is the 
opportunity to shape the agenda. The non-discriminatory nature 
Of concessions avoids carrying the high costs of exclusions of 
the kind involved in PAFTA, China and the ASEAN countries need 
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not be excluded by their incapacity to make comprehensive 
commitments to intra-Pacific free trade, so long as they are able 
to offer liberalisation that contributes substantially to trade 
expansion. The 'Pacific Round' would be entered at a time of 
crisis, and the developed countries and NiEs would be aware of 
the high consequences of failure to make substantial progress. 
There would remain the problem of resentment in the United States 
polity towards any 'free ride' for European agriculture. There 
would be pressures for the United States to take its 'massive 
retaliation' to a conclusion alongside the Pacific Round. 
A much better strategy, should the European Community persist in 
current positions, may be to regionalise the retaliation and its 
costs in the context of the Pacific Round. 
The fiscal burden could be shared by the developed countries, or 
by countries with per capita income above a specified level. The 
burden sharing would be fiscally and psychologically helpful in 
the United States. The fiscal commitments would be greatly 
unwelcome elsewhere in this region, but would need to be weighed 
against the benefits of strengthening the multilateral system and 
of genuine liberalisation within that system. In Japan, they 
""wouTd rree^i—to—be—judged—alongside o±her politically more 
difficult pressures for 'burden sharing' with the United States. 
In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, they would be partially 
compensated by the alleviation of what haB been in recent years a 
major sectoral problem, generated by the United States' 
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unilateral implementation of the export enhancement program. In 
the current fiscal circumstances of the United States, regional 
burden-sharing, especially the participation of Japan, would 
substantially enhance the credibility of the retaliation. 
Hopefully such retaliation would never actually be required. 
The central concept of a regional round of negotiations directed 
towards multilateral concessions, but focussed on issues of high 
regional interest, has been discussed from time to time over the 
past decade. it only ever did, and still does, make sense as a 
complement to the primary goal of a successful GATT round. Its 
feasibility has been enhanced in recent years by the practice of 
regional cooperation in a wide range of trade policy matters, 
including in preparation for the Uruguay Round.56 
It seems to us that a response to failure in the Uruguay Round 
along these lines would hold out rather better prospects than 
PAFTA for holding the line on corrosion of the multilateral 
system, promoting intra-Pacific liberalisation, and securing 
progress on reduction of barriers to trade between Europe and the 
Pacific. 
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